A Congressional Override of Supreme Court Decisions
American constitutional culture, despite the protestations of many political scientists, is thoroughly judicial at least regarding the controve
rsial conflicts that engage the imagination of the nation. The Court virtually has the final say concerning the results of constitutional conflicts and the authority to determine constitutional norms and the character and content of constitutional concepts. This judicial supremacy isn’t inevitable. An interbranch solution between Congress and the Court might serve the virtues of republicanism and democracy better than judicial supremacy. Chief Justice Marshall entertained the possibility of a congressional override, although admittedly his remarks were prompted by circumstances in which the newly established Jeffersonian Republican administration was intent on attacking (or even eliminating) the last bastion of Federalist powers, the federal courts. Rather than impeach a Supreme Court Justice, Chief Justice Marshall writes: “I think the modern doctrine of impeachment should yield to an appellate jurisdiction in the legislature. A reversal of those legal opinions deemed unsound by the legislature would certainly better comport with the mildness of our character than [would] a removal of the judge who has rendered them unknowing of his fault.” 3 Albert J Beveridge, The Life of John Marshall 177 (19191). The point here is that sharing the interpretation of the Constitution between the legislature and the courts would promote a system of self-government where the people and their representatives would play a vital role–at least a co-equal role–with an unelected Court. Additional structures linking the different branches of government would preclude 5-4 decisions where both sides have reasonable arguments, yet the vote of one individual determines the future of the nation.




